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Jurisdictional Reach For Interpleading
Aliens: Can Use Of § 1655 Coexist
With Federal Interpleader Law?
In Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc. v. Garmaise,1 an American investment
firm commenced an interpleader action 2 in order to resolve a dispute
over various trust accounts in its possession. However, some of the par-
ties disputing the distribution of the trust accounts were citizens of for-
eign countries who refused to submit to the jurisdiction of the American
court. 3 These foreign claimants argued that the interpleader action was
in personam and, therefore, could not proceed unless they were person-
ally served within the United States.4 The district court disagreed, hold-
1. 519 F. Supp. 682 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
2. An interpleader action allows a party to avoid multiple claims in the face of a
single liability. The party (the stakeholder) can bring all claimants with an interest in
the disputed assets (the stake) before the court at one time where they can present
their claims and litigate the issues among themselves. The stakeholder may deposit
the stake with the court and remove itself from the dispute. An interpleader action
results in the stakeholder meeting its obligation and exempting itself from all further
liability. For a description and history of interpleader, see Professor Zechariah
Chafee's series of articles published from 1921 to 1943: Modernizing Interpleader, 30
YALE L.J. 814 (1921); Interstate Interpleader, 33 YALE LJ. 685 (1924); Interpleader in the
United States Courts, 41 YALE L.J. 1134 (1932) and 42 YALE L.J. 41 (1932); The Federal
Interpleader Act of 1936: 1 &II, 45 YALE LJ. 963 & 1161 (1935-36); Federal Interpleader
Since the.Act of 1936, 49 YALE L.J. 377 (1940); Broadening Federal Interpleader, 56 HARV.
L. REV. 929 (1943). See also Hazard & Moskovitz, An Historical and Critical Anlaysis [sic]
of Interpleader, 52 CALIF. L. REV. 706 (1964).
3. Garmaise at 685-86. The trust accounts held by the American investment firm
were created by Judah Leib Gewurz in 1978 through a testamentary document cre-
ated in Israel. This document revised an earlier will executed by Gewurz in Canada
in 1975 and transferred to various family members' funds from a Liechtenstein cor-
poration that Gewurz co-owned with his wife. The dispute turned on the legality of
the Israeli document and on Gewurz's power to effect a testamentary disposition of
corporate assets. Id. at 683-84.
4. In personam jurisdiction bases personal jurisdiction on a court having jurisdic-
tion over a party's person rather than a party's property. An in personam judgment
imposes a personal obligation on the defendant in favor of the plaintiff, rather than
imposing a judgment against a thing. In personam jurisdiction also exposes the
defendant to related cross-claims. In personam jurisdiction requires effective service
upon the interested parties, while non-personal jurisdiction may proceed without
personal notice to the interested parties. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 199-200
(1976). Cf 3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 5, at 68-69 (1982) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) JUDGMENTs]; Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction,
1965 Sup. CT. REV. 241; Clermont, Restating Territorial Jurisdiction And Venue for State
And Federal Courts, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 411, 414 (1981).
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ing that the disputed assets were a form of property that supported the
exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction. 5 The district court, therefore,
ordered the foreign claimants to appear and authorized service beyond
the borders of the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 1655.6
This Note discusses the validity of a United States federal court
utilizing a statute such as 28 U.S.C. § 1655 to obtain jurisdiction over
foreigners in an interpleader action. The Note begins with a discussion
of the holding in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy. 7 In Dunlevy, the United
States Supreme Court held that an interpleader action concerning a
debt on an insurance policy was a personal action and could not reason-
ably be reified to support non-personal jurisdiction.8 Although the
5. 519 F. Supp. at 686-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Quasi in rem jurisdiction is based on a
court's power over property within its territory; it results in a judgment affecting the
interests of particular persons in a designated thing. The court's jurisdiction in a
quasi in rem judgment is limited to the property supporting the jurisdiction. The
property owner is not exposed to any personal liability. Another form of non-per-
sonal jurisdiction is in rem jurisdiction. In rem jurisdiction also is based on a court's
power over property within its territory, but produces a judgment affecting the inter-
ests of all persons in a designated thing. The jurisdiction of a court in an in rem
judgment is also limited to the property supporting the jurisdiction. Shafer, 433 U.S.
at 199, n.17; 14 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 3631 (1985) [hereinafter WRIGHT & MILLER]; Clermont, supra note 4, at 414;
Hazard, supra note 4.
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1655 commonly referred to as the "lien enforcement statute"
provides:
In an action in a district court to enforce any lien upon or claim to, or to
remove any incumbrance or lien or cloud upon the title to, real or personal
property within the district, where any defendant cannot be served within the
State, or does not voluntarily appear, the court may order the absent defend-
ant to appear or plead by a day certain.
Such order shall be served on the absent defendant personally if practica-
ble, wherever found, and also upon the person or persons in possession or
charge of such property, if any. Where personal service is not practicable,
the order shall be published as the court may direct, not less than once a
week for six consecutive weeks.
If an absent defendant does not appear or plead within the time allowed,
the court may proceed as if the absent defendant had been served with pro-
cess within the State, but any adjudication shall, as regards the absent
defendant without appearance, affect only the property which is the subject
of the action. When a part of the property is within another district, but
within the same state, such action may be brought in either district.
Any defendant not so personally notified may, at any time within one year
after final judgment, enter his appearance, and thereupon the court shall set
aside the judgment and permit such defendant to plead on payment of such
costs as the court deems just.
7. 241 U.S. 518 (1916). For a discussion of the Dunlevy casesee infra notes 16-24,
32-39.
8. Id. Throughout this note, in personam jurisdiction will be referred to as per-
sonal jurisdiction, and in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction as non-personal jurisdiction.
Two distinct types of quasi in rem actions exist: in subtype-one, specific persons seek
to establish a pre-existing interest in the thing in question; in subtype-two, courts
seize a thing to support jurisdiction over an unrelated claim against the owner of the
thing. See Clermont, supra note 4; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) JUDGMENTS § 6, at 73.
Interpleader actions, and, therefore, this Note, involve only quasi in rem subtype-one.
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breadth of the holding in Dunlevy is disputed,9 this Note asserts that
Dunlevy established the proposition that unless the stake at issue could
reasonably support an action in rem, the federal court could not go for-
ward without obtaining personal jurisdiction over all the parties. 10 Con-
gress later solved the problem of obtaining jurisdiction in purely
domestic cases by expressly giving federal courts personal jurisdiction in
interpleader cases so long as the parties were within the United States
and could be found for service.11 This Note contends that Congress's
action, though solving the Dunlevy problem 12 for cases where the parties
can be found within the United States, failed to solve this problem in the
international context. In cases like Garmaise, therefore, the nature of the
stake remains critical in current interpleader law; if the stake is incapable
of reification, the court cannot serve overseas claimants, and conse-
quently the case cannot go forward. For this reason, courts must make a
principled determination as to whether a stake constitutes a res; if the
stake cannot be reified, courts should not use § 1655 non-personal ser-
vice to reach a party outside the United States.
In Part One, this Note discusses Dunlevy and its successor cases,
contending that the Dunlevy Court saw no essential difference between
debts on insurance policies and other intangible debts with regard to
their potential for reification. Part Two outlines the changes in general
jurisdictional theory since Dunlevy, maintaining that Shaffer v. Heitner's
resurrection of the importance of power in jurisdictional theory reestab-
lishes the importance of the Dunlevy problem. Part Three applies cur-
rent jurisdictional theory to interpleader law, and Parts Four and Five
argue that the structure and history of interpleader law show that Con-
gress intended its resolution of the Dunlevy problem to extend only to
purely domestic cases: Congress granted federal courts personal juris-
diction in interpleader cases only over persons found within the bounda-
ries of a United States district court. Because Congress structured
interpleader law on the distinction between personal and nonpersonal
jurisdiction, this Note argues that it is inappropriate for courts to side-
step the question of whether a debt can reasonably be reified and apply
§ 1655's non-personal service provisions. This Note argues instead for
minor reform of the Federal Interpleader Act, and for principled judicial
inquiries into the nature of each interpleader stake.
I. The Case Law on the Nature of Interpleader Actions
A. The Dunlevy Case
The equitable remedy of interpleader was created to "protect a party
9. See infra note 17 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
11. See infra § IV.B.
12. The term "Dunlevy problem" refers to the situation where it is unreasonable
to reify a debt and therefore to apply non-personal jurisdiction.
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against ... double vexation in respect of one liability."' 3 In an inter-
pleader action, a stakeholder, such as the investment firm in Garmaise,
faces more than one claim against the stake it holds. Interpleader allows
the stakeholder to require the various claimants to assert their adverse
claims in a single action. The stakeholder may, therefore, avoid the mul-
tiple liability that could otherwise arise from only one stake.
The case law has defined interpleader actions in two ways: as
strictly personal actions,' 4 and as actions which can be either personal
or non-personal depending upon the particular nature of the stake. 15
The primary authority for the characterization as strictly personal is New
York Life Insurance Co. v. Dunlevy. 16 The Dunlevy opinion, however, was
brief and ambiguous, leaving considerable room for disagreement over
13. National Fire Ins. Co. v. Sanders, 38 F.2d 212, 214 (5th Cir. 1930) (fire insur-
ance company faced with claim from insured and from garnishee of insured used
interpleader for protection against double vexation). For a general history of inter-
pleader, see Chafee, supra note 2.
14. Metro Life Ins. Co. v. Dumpson, 194 F. Supp. 9, 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (in an
interpleader action by life insurer as a stakeholder of the cash surrender value of a
policy, the court held that: "[I]nterpleader is an action in personam which brings
about a 'final and conclusive adjudication of * * * personal rights' and requires that a
claimant to the fund be brought before the court in order for a judgment to be bind-
ing upon him); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Du Roure, 123 F. Supp. 736, 740 (S.D.N.Y.
1954) (in an interpleader action by insurer as a stakeholder of annuity policies, the
court held that interpleader is not an action in rem); Metro Life Ins. Co. v. Skov, 45 F.
Supp. 140, 142 (D. Or. 1942) (in an interpleader action by life insurance company
where all claimants were out-of-state citizens, the court held that the interpleader
action was in personam).
15. U.S. v. Estate of Swan, 441 F.2d 1082 (5th Cir. 1971) (in an interpleader
action by a bank as stakeholder of assets of an estate, the court held that the action
was quasi in rem because assets of an estate on deposit in a bank pursuant to a court
order constitute specific property); Guy v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 429
F.2d 828 (6th Cir. 1970) (an interpleader action by a bank as stakeholder of oil and
gas lease assignments where the court held that the action was quasi in rem because
the law of the state defined an interest in an oil and gas well as a property right);
Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc. v. Garmaise, 519 F. Supp at 686-87 (in interpleader
action by an investment firm as stakeholder of assets of an estate, the court held that
the action was quasi in rem because the investment firm had a real interest in the deter-
mination of the rightful title holder to the assets); Cordner v. Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co., 234 F. Supp. 765, 767 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (an interpleader action by
insurer as stakeholder of life insurance policy where the court held that actions
involving insurance policies are in personam because the proceeds of an insurance pol-
icy do not constitute specific property); Kuerschner & Rauchwarenfabrik, A.G. v. New
York Trust Co., 126 F. Supp. 684, 689 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (an interpleader action by
New York bank as stakeholder of frozen funds of Hungarian corporation where the
court held that the action was in personam because the funds did not constitute specific
property); Republic of China v. American Express Co., 95 F. Supp. 740 (S.D.N.Y.
1951), aff'd 195 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1952), on remand 108 F. Supp. 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1952)
(interpleader action by bank as stakeholder of deposits by the postal system of the
Chinese government where the court suggested that the action could be converted to
quasi in reni proceeding by depositing the funds with the court).
16. 241 U.S. 518 (1916) (an interpleader action by insurer as stakeholder of
insurance policy proceeds where the court held that the action resulted in a personal
judgment against one of the claimants and therefore was an action in personam).
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the actual extent of the Court's holding.1 7 Some courts have extrapo-
lated broad principles about the nature of interpleader actions from
Dunlevy, 18 while other courts have held that Dunlevy should be limited to
cases involving insurance policies.19
In Dunlevy, an insurance company faced three separate claims on
one life insurance policy.20 The insurance company was allowed to
interplead the three claimants and remove itself from the lawsuit after
depositing with the court funds equal to the amount of the policy. The
interpleader action took place in Pennsylvania, and notice was given to
Mrs. Dunlevy, one of the claimants and the daughter of the policyholder,
in California. Mrs. Dunlevy failed to appear, and the interpleader action
proceeded without her. The Pennsylvania state court deemed invalid
Mrs. Dunlevy's claim that her father had assigned the proceeds to her.
2 t
The United States Supreme Court held that the Pennsylvania court did
not have personal jurisdiction over Mrs. Dunlevy and overruled the
Pennsylvania court's determination, stating that:
The established general rule is that any personal judgment which a
state court may render against one who did not voluntarily submit to its
jurisdiction, and who is not a citizen of the State, nor served with process
within its borders, no matter what the mode of service, is void, because
the court had no jurisdiction over his person.2 2
The principle most clearly derived from the Dunlevy opinion is that the
dispute over the alleged assignment of the insurance proceeds was a
personal action requiring personal jurisdiction. The stake was a con-
tract debt and, according to the Court, the adjudication of the rights to
that debt settled personal rights. The action, therefore, was not an
action against property.2 3 It is unclear whether Dunlevy establishes that
all interpleader actions are personal actions or merely that this particu-
lar proceeding was a personal action. Although the Dunlevy Court
broadly refers to "personal judgments," the opinion seems to rest on
the specific determination that an adjudication of the rights to an insur-
17. See, e.g., U.S. v. Estate of Swan, 441 F.2d 1082 (5th Cir. 1971); Bache Halsey
Stuart Shields, Inc. v. Garmaise, 519 F. Supp at 682; WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 5,
§ 3636; Hazard, supra note 4; von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A
Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1158 (1966).
18. See supra note 14 for cases which have cited Dunlevy for the broad principle
that an interpleader action is an in personam action.
19. See supra note 15 for cases which have held that interpleader actions were quasi
in rein.
20. 241 U.S. 518 (1916). After the policy matured, the policyholder claimed the
proceeds. His daughter, Mrs. Dunlevy, claimed the proceeds on the ground that he
had previously assigned them to her. Finally, a creditor of Mrs. Dunlevy claimed the
proceeds on the ground that if she was entitled to the money, the proceeds should be
garnished to satisfy a judgment previously rendered for the creditor against Mrs.
Dunlevy. Id. at 519-20.
21. Id. at 520.
22. Id. at 521-23.
23. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 519 F. Supp. at 687, n.12.
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ance debt is a personal judgment. 24
B. Progeny of Dunlevy
Cases citing Dunlevy for the proposition that interpleader actions are
personal actions have consistently been insurance cases in which the
stake was, as in Dunlevy, an insurance contract debt. In some of these
cases, courts used broad language defining interpleader as a personal
action without regard to the nature of the stake. 25 In another, the court
used narrow language establishing only that the insurance debt in ques-
tion was not property that could support quasi in rem jurisdiction.2 6
The cases holding that interpleader actions can be quasi in rem
actions are all non-insurance cases. 27 These cases all limit Dunlevy's
holding to its specific facts. The leading such case is United States v.
Estate of Swan.
28
In Swan, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
rejected the idea that Dunlevy stands for the proposition that inter-
pleader actions are strictly personal. 29 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that
Dunlevy turned on the interpretation and consideration of the constitu-
tionality of the Pennsylvania in rem service statute. It stated that Dun-
levy's determination that the Pennsylvania court's decision was not
binding was based on the statute's inadequate due process, by "not
provid[ing] for effective representation of the interests of a claimant not
personally served . . . ,,13 The Swan court held that the federal service
provision, § 1655, met the due process concerns raised in Dunlevy. Also,
the stake in dispute in Swan, a bank account representing the remaining
assets of an estate, was a form of property over which quasi in rem juris-
diction could be exercised. Therefore, § 1655 service could be
applied.
3 '
24. This assertion is supported by the fact that the broad language in Dunlevy only
refers to "personal judgments" after the court has already decided that the determi-
nation of the insurance debt was a personal judgment. 241 U.S. at 519-20.
25. See Metro Life Ins. Co. v. Dumpson, 194 F. Supp. 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Aetna
Life Ins. Co. v. Du Roure, 123 F. Supp. 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
26. See Cordner v. Metro Life Ins. Co., 234 F. Supp 765 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (in an
interpleader action by insurer as stakeholder of life insurance, the court held that
actions involving insurance policies are in personam because the proceeds of an insur-
ance policy do not constitute specific property).
27. See, e.g., U.S. v. Estate of Swan, 441 F.2d 1082 (5th Cir. 1971); Garmaise, 514 F.
Supp. at 687, n.12; Georgia Say. Bank & Trust Co. v. Sims, 321 F. Supp. 307, 309
(N.D. Ga. 1971); A/S Krediit Bank v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 155 F. Supp 30
(S.D.N.Y. 1957) (in an interpleader action by American bank as stakeholder of depos-
its of Estonian bank, the court held that the action was quasi in rem because the securi-
ties held by the American bank were personal property).
28. 441 F.2d 1082.
29. Id. at 1086.
30. Id.
31. Id. Swan has been cited to support the proposition that "insofar as modern
notions ofjurisdiction require only that due process be satisfied to enable an action
to proceed, the characterization of interpleader as in personam or in rem has little
validity." 7 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 5, § 1711 at 563.
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The Fifth Circuit's reasoning in limiting Dunlevy seems untenable.
Dunlevy's broad language concerning jurisdiction over personal rights
suggests that the Supreme Court was not merely dissatisfied with the
structure of Pennsylvania's quasi in rem service statute.32 Rather, the
Court in Dunlevy was concerned with the fact that the Pennsylvania court
could not determine Mrs. Dunlevy's rights to the insurance proceeds
without personal service of Mrs. Dunlevy within Pennsylvania.3 3
Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit's misinterpretation of the holding in
Dunlevy allowed it merely to conclude that the stake in Swan, a bank
account, was a form of property that would support quasi in rem jurisdic-
tion. If the Swan court had correctly interpreted Dunlevy, it would then
have needed to distinguish a bank account from an insurance policy,
rather than merely concluding the account formed a res.
C. Authority Cited by the Dunlevy Court
The authority cited by the Dunlevy Court demonstrates that it considered
the Pennsylvania interpleader action to be personal, thus requiring in
personamjurisdiction. The Dunlevy court cited Pennoyer v. Neff, 34 a treatise
on Attachment and Garnishment, 35 and an Ohio Supreme Court case,
Cross v. Armstrong.36 Citing Cross v. Armstrong indicates that the Court
thought interpleader of a debt was not in rem because in Cross the Ohio
Supreme Court analyzed the differences between in rem and in personam
actions and concluded that interpleader of a debt was not in remn. 3 7
32. As Professor Moore stated, Dunlevy speaks to general jurisdictional principles,
not the structure of the Pennsylvania service statute:
While a court may obtain in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction over adverse
claimants to a specific res, such as the corpus of a trust estate, a fund, securi-
ties, or other chattels, a person against whom in personam liability is asserted
may not transform that liability into a res by depositing money into court and
thus enable the court to proceed to an adjudication, by in rem or quasi in rem
process, of the defendant's in personam claims against the plaintiff. This was
the teaching of the Dunlevy case.
3A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 22.06 at 22-41 to 22-42 (2d. ed. 1986) [hereinafter
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE].
33. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518, 521-23 (1916). The Dunlevy Court stated that the inter-
pleader action ".. . was an attempt to bring about a final and conclusive adjudication
of personal rights, not merely to discover property and apply it to debts. And unless
in contemplation of law [Mrs. Dunlevy] was before the court and required to respond
to that issue, its order and judgment in respect thereto were not binding on her." Id.
at 521. According to Professor Chafee, "the Supreme Court assumed without any
question that the notice to [Mrs. Dunlevy] was made with due formalities and rested
entirely upon general grounds of jurisdiction ...... Chafee, Interstate Interpleader,
supra note 2, at 713.
34. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
35. Shinn, ON ATTACHMENT AND GARNISHMENT § 674 (1896).
36. 44 OHIO ST. 613 (1887).
37. The Ohio Supreme Court's discussion of the nature of interpleader action in
Cross v. Armstrong sheds light on the Dunlevy holding:
[I]t appears that a judgment in rem, at least when against any thing, may bind
the res in the absence of any personal notice to the parties interested, but a
judgment in personam, as we have seen, can have no validity except upon ser-
vice upon the interested parties, or what is equivalent to it. Why was the
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Professor Zechariah Chafee, the leading figure in the development
of federal interpleader law,38 analyzed both the Dunlevy and the Cross
opinions and concluded that such suits against insurance companies are
clearly proceedings in personam.3 9 But although Chafee believed that
interpleader of a debt was not in rem, he also believed that interpleader
was not necessarily a personal action. According to Chafee, if certain
circumstances are present, interpleader may be a non-personal action.
For example, Chafee believed that interpleader could be a non-personal
action if the stake involved were land or certain chattels physically situ-
ated in the district of the proceedings. 40 If the chattel were a moveable
chattel, however, physical presence might not be enough to allow a
court to exercise non-personal jurisdiction for interpleader. Chafee
believed that if the chattel were in the district without the consent of a
claimant, the court must consider whether the exercise of non-personal
jurisdiction would be unfair to the nonresident claimant.4 1 Another sit-
uation where Chafee believed that the exercise of non-personal jurisdic-
tion in interpleader would be possible is when a debt is "represented by
documents which may often be regarded as chattels."' 42 Promissory
notes, bills of exchange, and corporate bonds are examples of such
Philadelphia action, in its nature, not a proceeding between parties claiming
right to money due under the policy, rather than a proceeding to determine
the status of such money? If it was the former, then the efficacy of the judg-
ment depended upon having the parties before the court, so that their con-
flicting claims could be adjudicated; .... It was not the status of any particular
money that was to be determined, for any money which was a legal tender
would have effectually satisfied the claim of the party receiving it; .... The
proceeding was clearly one of interpleader, and that only. We do not under-
stand that an action in personam, simply because a debtor brings money, the
right to recover which is in contention, and gives to the custody of the court a
sum sufficient to discharge his debt, changes into an action in rein, or that an
interpleader suit is, in its nature, a proceeding in rent .... Then, does the
mere fact that the company, (the debtor,) being sued, voluntarily delivers
money to the clerk of the court, rather than keep it in its own safe, or to its
credit in bank, or loaned upon call, change the action from one in personam to
one in rein? We think not.
Id. at 625-26.
38. For a list of Chafee's writings on interpleader, see supra note 2. For a discus-
sion of Chafee's role in the development of the Federal Interpleader Act, see infra
notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
39. Chafee stated that
A suit by one person against an insurance company is clearly a proceeding in
personam. If two persons bring separate suits against the company on the
same policy, each suit is in personam. Interpleader is nothing but a device to
unite these two suits in one litigation, which continues to be in personam and
does not change its character when the money is paid into court. It is an
attempt to adjudicate mere personal rights to a money demand.
Chafee, Interstate Inteipleader, supra note 2, at 714-15.
40. Id. at 698-701.
41. Id. at 699.




The court in Garmaise could have used Chafee's reasoning to sup-
port its application of non-personal jurisdiction to the assets held by the
investment firm.44 Unfortunately, the Garmaise court simply made a con-
clusory statement that the assets were a discrete res.45 By failing to
demonstrate the differences between the intangible debt before it and
the intangible debt before the Dunlevy Gourt, the Garmaise court left
unsolved the Dunlevy problem: When is it reasonable to reify a debt and,
consequently, reasonable to apply non-personal jurisdiction?
Chafee dealt directly with the Dunlevy problem, offering a way to
distinguish bank deposits from insurance policies. He used Justice
Holmes's idea46 that money in the bank is the same thing as coin in the
pocket, thus justifying application of non-personal jurisdiction "for
interpleader by a savings bank in the state where it is located, but not for
interpleader by a life insurance company since insurance is not
equivalent to coin in the pocket. ' ' 47 According to Chafee, because "the
bank's state is not only the domicile of the debtor but the only place
provided by contract for the payment of the debt, we have an argument
for asserting a jurisdiction in rem which does not exist for ordinary debts
.... 4 Many kinds of modem bank deposit and investment accounts
strain Chafee's reasoning, however, by being payable in more than one
state and, following Chafee's reasoning, therefore, being unable to sup-
port in rem jurisdiction.
49
The final situation where Chafee believed non-personal jurisdiction
could be applied to interpleader would be when the stake is under
administration in a probate proceeding.50 A probate court's power to
give complete relief, regardless of its lack of personal jurisdiction over
the claimant, is based on the theory that a probate court has territorial
jurisdiction over the estate. 5 t Traditionally, however, probate courts
have been granted this power, not because of jurisdictional theory, but
because of the public need for ensuring the alienability of assets. Public
policy, therefore, requires that a probate court have the power to clear
43. However, as Chafee pointed out, the theory that negotiable instruments will
support non-personal jurisdiction was rejected in Cleveland National Bank v. Bur-
roughs, 10 Oh. App. 61 (1917). Id. at 700, n.50.
44. For further discussion of Ganmaise, see infra notes 58-61 and accompanying
text.
45. The district court in Garmaise may have failed to explain its characterization of
the assets held by Bache because it justified applying § 1655 as a matter of necessity
and public policy. See itfra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
46. 188 U.S. 189 (1903), rev'd, Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota 280 U.S.
204 (1930).
47. Chafee, Interstate Interpleader, supra note 2, at 705.
48. Id. at 701.
49. For example, bank accounts that automatically transfer money from savings
accounts to checking and investment accounts, thereby providing for access to funds
in the form of checks, are payable in more than one state.
50. Chafee, Interstate Inteipleader, supra note 2, at 698.
51. Simes, The Administration Of A Decedent s Estate As A Proceeding In Ren, 43 MICH.
L. RE V. 675 (1945).
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in one proceeding title to all the assets of an estate. 52 Thus, if a debt is
part of an estate under administration, and the object of an interpleader
action, a court may be justified in applying non-personal jurisdiction.
D. Distinguishing Insurance Debts From Bank Accounts
In summary, the case law after Dunlevy fails to address the issue of when
a debt may reasonably be reified. The pattern that emerges does not
provide a theoretical basis for distinguishing between different types of
stakes. Cases which have followed Dunlevy have all been insurance cases
with facts similar to Dunlevy, and have all typically used broad language
in defining interpleader as a personal action. 5 3 Cases which have either
distinguished Dunlevy on narrow grounds, or have ignored it, have
involved stakes that the courts determined could reasonably be reified to
support non-personal jurisdiction, 54 but these cases do not contain any
reasoning to justify the reification.
No clear reason seems to exist, therefore, for treating the proceeds
of an insurance policy as a personal debt while treating assets such as
the proceeds of a bank account as a specific res.5 5 Those reasons
advanced by the courts thus far are inadequate. For example, courts
have attempted to justify applying § 1655 service on the ground that the
interpleader action removes a cloud on the stake,56 but this begs the
question of whether the stake itself is property within the jurisdiction
capable of supporting non-personal jurisdiction. Nor can the difference
be that one type of property is tangible and the other is intangible,
because the "distinction between tangibles and intangibles is artificial
and has not been relied upon by the courts . . .,,5
52. See Case of Broderick's 1ill, 88 U.S. 503, 519 (1874) ("The world must move on,
and those who claim an interest in persons or things must be charged with knowledge
of their status and condition, and of the vicissitudes to which they are subject. This is
the foundation of all judicial proceedings in rem.").
53. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
54. Compare cases cited in note 25 supra, which use broad language defining inter-
pleader as a personal action without regard to the nature of the stake, with cases in
note 28 supra, which limit Dunlevy to its specific concern with an insurance policy.
55. The New York Court of Appeals explained why an insurance policy is a per-
sonal debt: (1) the purchaser buys the right to a given sum of money at a specified
point in time; (2) the purchaser does not deposit a set fund with the insurer to cover
the liability; and (3) the insurer charges fees from other purchasers so that it can
cover its liabilities when they come due. Hanna v. Stedman, 230 N.Y. 326 (1921).
This reasoning indicates that a bank account should be treated like an insurance pol-
icy. A bank account is a personal debt between the depositor and the bank. The
depositor deposits a fund with the bank but only has a right to the value of his
deposit; he has no claim on the specific currency he deposited with the bank. Finally,
there is no "set fund" representing a deposit which can be identified as a specific res.
Rather, the bank uses other customers' deposits to pay back a depositor just like an
insurance company uses other customers' fees to pay off matured policies. Attempts
by courts to distinguish between the two debts have been unsatisfactory.
56. See Swan, 441 F.2d 1082 (5th Cir. 1971); Garmaise, 519 F. Supp 682 (S.D.N.Y.
1981).
57. 7 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 5, § 1711 at 563. A bank account traditionally
is considered to be a personal debt between the depositor and the depositee, but
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Courts also have used public policy as a way of avoiding the ques-
tion of whether or not a stake can support reification. The Garmaise
court, for example, reasoned that because the policy underlying inter-
pleader law is to protect stakeholders from multiple liability, § 1655 ser-
vice must be applied to interpleader situations to ensure that claimants
cannot evade personal service. 58
This policy is particularly cogent here, where Bache, a large brokerage
house located in New York, an international center of business and com-
merce available to parties from around the world, is faced with conflicting
claims to assets it holds for foreign citizens. To deny interpleader relief
to such a stakeholder presages a burgeoning problem whereby persons,
however widely dispersed in foreign land, could take advantage of the
financial expertise available in New York protecting the New York finan-
cial institutions when disputes arise as to the ownership of assets placed
in their charge.
59
Recitations of public policy, however, do not change a stake from
being other than a personal debt. Moreover, this reasoning ignores the
congressional intent behind the creation of federal interpleader law. As
discussed later, Congress enacted interpleader law to solve the Dunlevy
problem for domestic, interstate interpleading. 60 Congress did not also
give the courts power to reach internationally. If courts needed federal
legislation to exercise interpleader jurisdiction over claimants residing
in other states, when the stake was property incapable of supporting
non-personal jurisdiction, logic would suggest they also need Congres-
sional authorization in such circumstances to reach foreign claimants.
Thus, the very presence of federal interpleader, with its inherent limita-
tions ofjurisdiction, 6 1 indicates that courts in international interpleader
situations must face the Dunlevy problem of deciding when it is reason-
able to reify a debt, rather than skirt the issue on public policy grounds.
H. Case Law and Trends in the Jurisprudence of Jurisdiction
A number of cases that distinguished Dunlevy did so on the ground that
subsequent changes in jurisdictional theory had diminished the effect of
courts have treated bank accounts as a res by arguing that the account is "money in
the bank" which is the same thing as a special fund which the bank is ready and
willing to pay. See, e.g., U.S. v. Estate of Swan, 441 F.2d 1082 (5th Cir. 1971); Aetna
Life Ins. Co. v. Du Roure, 123 F. Supp. 736, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Republic of China
v. American Express Co., 95 F. Supp. 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd 195 F.2d 230 (2d
Cir. 1952), on remand 108 F. Supp. 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Sherman Nat'l Bank v. Shu-
bert Theatrical Co., 238 F. 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1916), aff'd 247 F. 256 (2d Cir. 1917) (the
court held that a bank account should be viewed as a special fund which the bank is
willing and able to pay out upon request and, therefore, is equivalent to specific
property).
58. 519 F. Supp at 686.
59. Id.
60. See infra notes 98, 121-23, 137-45 and accompanying text.
61. See infra notes 126-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of the bounda-
ries of federal interpleader's jurisdiction.
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its holding.6 2 Specifically, power, whether over the persons or the res,
had ceased to be the jurisdictional test; the Court was more concerned
with the reasonableness of a forum. These cases therefore argued that
"distinctions between actions in personam and actions in rem had deterio-
rated, making the Dunlevy problem irrelevant."163 This section therefore
discusses the history ofjurisdictional theory from Dunlevy to the present,
showing that, despite changes in the theory over time, the Dunlevy prob-
lem is still relevant.
A. Jurisdictional Theory at the Time of Dunlevy
When Dunlevy was decided, jurisdictional jurisprudence could be sum-
marized by Justice Holmes's famous quote, "[t]he foundation of juris-
diction is physical power... . "64 Pennoyer v. Neff 65 was then the seminal
case on jurisdictional theory. Pennoyer's two central concepts were that
"every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and authority over persons
or property within its territory," 66 and that "no state can exercise direct
jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its terri-
tory."' 6 7 The critical concern was whether a state possessed jurisdic-
tional power over the defendant; a court did not consider whether an
exercise of that power was reasonable. Accordingly, if a defendant's
debt could be classified as a res, a court had jurisdictional power over it
and could adjudicate the issue whether or not the defendant appeared in
court.68 Thus, when Dunlevy was decided, the distinction between per-
sonal and non-personal actions was critical. Under a pure power theory,
if an interpleader action could be characterized as non-personal, the
court could adjudicate claims to the res no matter how limited a claim-
ant's contacts with the forum.
69
B. Emergence of Reasonableness in Jurisdictional Theory
Pennoyer's power concept began to give way to the concept of reasona-
bleness, throwing into question Dunlevy's concern with the adjudication
of personal rights absent a court's jurisdictional power over the defend-
62. See 3A MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 32, 22.04 [2-2]; 7 WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 5, § 1711; von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 17.
63. 7 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 5, § 1711 at 563.
64. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917) (a personal judgment, rendered
on the basis of service by publication in a newspaper, declared void under the four-
teenth amendment).
65. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). Pennoyer laid out the theoretical framework of territorial
jurisdiction-in personam, in rem, quasi in ren. These categories still operate under
modern principles ofjurisdiction and provide the basis upon which courts apply the
power test.
66. Id. at 722.
67. Id.
68. This power theory allowed plaintiffs to exercise quasi in ren jurisdiction by
attaching a defendant's property as the basis ofjurisdiction on a claim unconnected
to that property. If the value of the property was less than the amount of the claim
asserted, the defendant often chose to default rather than submit to in personam juris-




ant's person. 70 This shift from a theory ofjurisdiction based on a power
test to one based on a reasonableness test 7 ' began in International Shoe
Co. v. Washington 72 and culminated in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co.7 3 The reasonableness test, through which courts would
"decide jurisdictional issues by balancing the interest of the public, the
plaintiff, and the defendant," became the accepted standard in the juris-
prudence ofjurisdiction, and seemed to render the Pennoyer distinctions
obsolete.
7 4
With the change to a reasonableness test, courts and commentators
questioned whether Dunlevy still controlled jurisdictional questions in
interpleader actions. 75 If reasonableness was the standard, a court
seemingly could exercise jurisdiction when the stake was within its
forum and the stakeholder needed assurance of being subject to a single
liability. Such jurisdiction could be exercised whether or not all the
claimants could be served within the forum state.
76
70. See supra note 62.
71. Clermont, supra note 4, at 411, 416-17.
72. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). "[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a
defendant to ajudgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the
forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend 'traditional notions offair play and substantial justice.'" 326 U.S. 310, 316, 320
(1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940) (emphasis added)).
73. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
Distinctions between actions in rem and those in personam are ancient and
originally expressed in procedural terms what seems really to have been a
distinction in the substantive law of property under a system quite unlike our
own .... American courts have sometimes classed certain actions as actions
in rem because personal service of process was not required, and at other
times have held personal service of process not required because the action
was in rem.
Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the
Due Process Clause but there can be no doubt that at a minimum they
require that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be pre-
ceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the
case.
Id. at 312-13.
74. According to the Supreme Court in Mullane:
It is not readily apparent how the courts of New York did or would classify
the present proceeding, which has some characteristics and is wanting in
some features of proceedings both in rem and in personam. But in any event we
think that the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution do not depend upon a classification for which the standards are
so elusive and confused generally and which, being primarily for state courts
to define, may and do vary from state to state ....
339 U.S. at 312-13. See also Clermont, supra note 4, at 418 for a recitation and appli-
cation of the reasonableness test.
75. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
76. See supra note 17 and accompanying text for cases where jurisdiction was exer-
cised even though all claimants could not be served within the forum state.
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C. Current Jurisdictional Theory: Reasonableness Alone is
Insufficient
When Dunlevy's relevance had sunk to the point where courts would
either completely ignore it or quickly distinguish it, the Supreme Court
revised territorial jurisdiction principles in Shaffer v. Heitner.77 Shaffer
created a two-step process consisting of both a power and a reasonable-
ness test.78 Subsequently, the Supreme Court affirmed that neither
power nor reasonableness was the sole standard. 79 Thus, a court now
uses power as a threshold test; only then does it inquire whether the
exercise of that power would be reasonable.
Although the distinction between personal and non-personal
actions may not be as important today as it was when Dunlevy was
decided, it is a distinction still critical to modem jurisdictional theory.
The Dunlevy problem, therefore, cannot be ignored. A court must deter-
mine whether the action is personal or non-personal, 80 and the court
must either have power over the persons, if the action is in personam, or
over the res. In other words, to apply the power test, the court must first
determine what it must exercise power over. If the action is non-per-
sonal, the court must inquire whether the claim is based upon specific
property (in rem). If it is not, the court must then determine whether
there is a debt that can be reified reasonably to provide quasi in rem
jurisdiction.
81
77. 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (state court tried to compel defendant corporate execu-
tives to appear in a shareholder's derivative suit by seizing defendants' corporate
stock, defined by a state statute as situs in the state; the court reversed, holding that
the exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction was unreasonable, as the property serving as
the basis for jurisdiction bore no relation to the plaintiff's cause of action).
78. The case for applying to jurisdiction in rem the same test of "fair play and
substantial justice" as governs assertions ofjurisdiction in personam is simple
and straightforward. It is premised on recognition that "[t]he phrase, 'judicial
jurisdiction over a thing,' is a customary elliptical way of referring to jurisdic-
tion over the interests of persons in a thing." [Citation omitted]. This recog-
nition leads to the conclusion that in order to justify an exercise of
jurisdiction in rem, the basis for jurisdiction must be sufficient to justify exer-
cising 'jurisdiction over the interests of persons in a thing." The standard
for determining whether an exercise ofjurisdiction over the interests of per-
sons is consistent with the Due Process Clause is the minimum-contacts stan-
dard elucidated in International Shoe.
Id. at 207.
79. "Once it has been decided that a defendant purposefully established mini-
mum contacts within the forum State, these contacts may be considered in light of
other factors to determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would com-
port with 'fair play and substantial justice.'" Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471
U.S. 462, 476 (1984) (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320).
80. For a discussion of whether interpleader actions are always personal, see supra
notes 24-54 and accompanying text.
81. Interpleader law, see infra notes 97-123, impinges on this test without destroy-
ing its necessity. Interpleader gives a court the power to move forward in a personal
action regarding a stake even though it does not have "power" over all the parties-
interpleader law steps in to give the court power and means of service. This does not
remove the necessity for solving the Dunlevy problem. If the action is non-personal,
the court must first have power over the res before it can exercise its power to inter-
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IH. Jurisdictional Theory for Interpleader
The modem approach for asserting jurisdiction allows certain inter-
pleader actions to support quasi in rem jurisdiction. These interpleader
actions may thus apply § 1655 non-personal service to quiet the title of
the stake. The two jurisdictional inquiries necessary to establish an
interpleader situation are reasonableness of reification and reasonable-
ness of forum.
A. Reasonableness of Reification
Reasonableness of reification is simply another means of characterizing
the test for whether a court has power over the stake. As Chafee indi-
cated in his writings, when the stake involved in the interpleader action
is land, or a chattel physically situated in the district, the court clearly
has power over the stake. 82 However, if the stake is a debt, the court
must justify treating the debt as if it were a thing. According to conflict
of laws theory, the state has power to exercise jurisdiction over an intan-
gible if the intangible is embodied in a document residing in the state.
8 3
However, many debts, such as bank accounts and insurance policies, are
not embodied in a document and, therefore, are not covered by this
theory.
A discrete, identifiable fund like assets in a trust account or certain
investment accounts, may represent another possibility for a reasonable
reification of debt. The New York Court of Appeals, in Hanna v.
Stedman,8 4 held that insurance policy premiums collected by the insur-
ance company and deposited into a general account from which all
claims are paid are not represented by any specific property because
there is no specific account that represents each policy holder's pro-
ceeds.8 5 This holding's reasoning would seem to include normal bank
deposits, but trust accounts and investment accounts not mixed into a
general fund seem to be distinguishable.
In summary, land and chattel physically located in the court's dis-
trict will meet the requirements of the power test. Debts embodied in a
document or represented by discrete identifiable assets, like trust
accounts and investment accounts, may meet the requirements of the
power test in interpleader actions. Debts that are mere rights to money,
payable under a contract but not represented by an identifiable fund,
plead claimants in other jurisdictions. If the stake is not located within the jurisdic-
tion, or is an intangible that cannot be reified, the court lacks power, and the case
cannot go forward in that jurisdiction.
82. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. However, if the chattel is moveable,
the reasonableness of the forum issue must still be addressed. See supra note 41 and
accompanying text.
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAws, § 63 (1971) ("A state has power
to exercise judicial jurisdiction to affect interests in an intangible thing embodied in a
document which is within the state.").
84. 230 N.Y. 326 (1921).
85. Id. at 333-34
405
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will not meet the requirements of the power test and cannot be reified
reasonably.
B. Reasonableness of Forum
Once a court satisfies the power test, it is necessary to determine
whether the court reasonably can exercise jurisdiction in its forum. The
reasonableness of a forum is based upon evaluating "the burden on the
defendant, the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute, the
plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, . . . and
the shared interest of the several States [and countries] in furthering
fundamental substantive social policies."18 6 Where the stake is land situ-
ated in the forum, courts presume reasonableness because of the impos-
sibility of moving it elsewhere as well as the historical right of states to
control property within their territory.8 7 If the stake is a moveable chat-
tel or an intangible debt, however, the court should undertake a reason-
ableness inquiry to ensure that a claimant is not forced into an unfair
forum.
In testing the reasonableness of the forum, a court should first
inquire as to the claimant's burden in having to litigate the claim in the
chosen forum. A court's concern for a defendant's possible burden is
not as great in quasi in rem interpleader actions as in typical liability
suits.88 In typical liability actions, defendants are dragged into court,
sometimes in a distant forum, and thereby forced to incur court fees and
attorney costs to defend themselves.8 9 In contrast, the claimant in an
interpleader action affirmatively seeks to obtain possession of a disputed
stake; that claimant will have to litigate in some forum.
One consideration in assessing the claimant's burden is whether, by
appearing in the interpleader action, the claimant is thereby being
86. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,477 (1984). Modem principles ofjurisdiction look to
see if the reification process in an interpleader action is reasonable rather than
whether or not the intangible debt has a definite location.
87. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207 (1977). The Supreme Court in
Shaffer stated that "when claims to the property itself are the source of the underlying
controversy between the plaintiff and the defendant, it would be unusual for the State
where the property is located not to have jurisdiction."
88. A foreign claimant may suffer hardship from being forced to travel to the
United States, as well as incurring extra litigation expenses by having to prove
whether or not foreign law is controlling. Under FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1, the claimants
can prove the foreign law to be applied. These burdens do not, however, raise due
process concerns.
Another complication when a case involves foreign claimants is that a court may
decide, as the Garmaise court did, to stay the proceedings until foreign courts have
settled the issues in the case that depend upon the application of foreign law. 519 F.
Supp. at 688.
89. Cf Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 808 (1985) (personal juris-
diction over absent class members sustained in a class action suit because "[t]he bur-
dens placed by a State upon an absent class-action plaintiff are not of the same order
or magnitude as those it places upon an absent defendant").
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exposed to any other claims.90 Courts should take a restrictive
approach to allowing cross-claims when the stake is a moveable chattel
or an intangible debt. Such a policy encourages non-residents to assert
their claims in foreign courts.9 1 Furthermore, by protecting claimants
from unreasonable exposure to personal liability, courts ensure that
their exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction comports with "fair play and
substantial justice."
9 2
The second consideration in the reasonableness inquiry is the
forum state's interest in exercising quasi in rem jurisdiction over the
stake. A forum state has an interest in providing a forum where all
claims to property located in its territory will be adjudicated at one pro-
ceeding. The forum state also has an interest in guaranteeing that stake-
holders within its boundaries are not subject to multiple liability when
they owe only one obligation. If the stake is an intangible or a moveable
tangible, however, the stakeholder should not be allowed access to a
chosen forum merely because the stakeholder is willing to deposit the
stake there. A reasonable connection should exist between the stake
and the forum state, such as a bank account where the funds were
deposited originally within the state, or a tangible stake received by the
stakeholder within the state.
9 3
The third consideration in the reasonableness inquiry is the stake-
holder's interest in having a court exercise jurisdiction over absent
90. Hallin v. G.A. Pearson, Inc., 34 F.R.D. 499, 503 (N.D. Cal. 1963).
("[A]llowance of an in personam cross-claim by one claimant against another should
rest, not upon the point of appearance but upon a cautious application of Rule 13 (g)
in light of the unique service of process feature of [the] Federal Interpleader Act.")
See also Marine Bank & Trust Co. v. Hamilton Bros., Inc., 55 F.R.D. 505 (D. Fla. 1972)
(where defendant in interpleader action was a non-resident who was served under
§ 2361, codefendant could not maintain cross-claim against defendant even though
defendant appeared in court to assert his claim to the stake).
91. Marine Bank & Trust Co. v. Hamilton Bros., Inc., 55 F.R.D. 505 (D. Fla.
1972); Hallin, 34 F.R.D. 499, 503 (N.D. Cal. 1963). See cases cited supra note 90 for
examples of courts protecting claimants from unreasonable exposure to personal lia-
bility so as not to discourage non-residents from asserting their claims in the United
States. This Note proposes changes in interpleader law designed to extend the pro-
tection interpleader actions provide for stakeholders to situations involving foreign
claimants. However, designating one forum where all claims can be presented and
settled will not provide a solution if a foreign court refuses to recognize ajudgment
of a United States court and if the stakeholder holds assets outside the country which
a claimant can attach. It has been stated that "[i]n establishing bases for jurisdiction
in the international sense, a legal system cannot confine its analysis solely to its own
ideas of what is just, appropriate, and convenient. To a degree it must take into
account the views of other communities concerned." von Mehren & Trautman, supra
note 17, at 1127.
To ensure the highest level of recognition possible for United States interpleader
actions, judgments of interpleader actions in which quasi in rem jurisdiction is
applied should be limited to the disposition of the stake. Additionally, foreign claim-
ants should be given immunity to service or other claims by parties if quasi in renm
jurisdiction is applied to interpleader actions. See Note, Quasi In RemJisdiction Over
Foreigners, 12 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 67, 79 (1979).
92. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
93. Chafee, Interstate hztepleader, supra note 2, at 699.
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claimants. This interest is based on the stakeholder's desire to escape
the possibility of multiple liability in regard to a single stake.9 4 The
stakeholder needs a forum where all adverse parties can be brought
together for a single and final resolution of the competing claims. The
stakeholder also needs assurance that, once it gives up the stake to the
court, the court can ensure that the stakeholder will be immune from
any further liability regarding the stake.
9 5
The final consideration in the reasonableness inquiry is the shared
interest of the several states and countries in furthering substantive
social policies. Interpleader actions promote two main goals: minimiz-
ing the possibility of multiple litigation and minimizing the threat of
inconsistent results.9 6 Both of these goals would be advanced by apply-
ing § 1655 to certain interpleader actions.
Thus, under modem principles of jurisdiction, a court can apply
§ 1655 service to some interpleader actions, thereby compelling the
claimants to appear in a chosen forum. To assert jurisdiction allowing
§ 1655 service, the court's connection to the stake must pass both the
power and the reasonableness of forum tests. The court passes the
power test if the stake is land or chattel physically located in the district,
or if debts embodied in a document or represented by discrete identifi-
able assets reside in the state. The forum is reasonable if the nonresi-
dent claimant is not unduly burdened by the choice of forum and the
stake has a reasonable connection with the forum.
IV. The Law of Interpleader.
Although modem principles ofjurisdiction justify the use of § 1655 ser-
vice in quasi in rem interpleader actions, courts and commentators have
failed to discuss adequately its use in interpleader. The discussion that
has occurred centers on the nature of interpleader and whether Dunlevy
means that all interpleader actions are in personam. More important,
however, is when it is unreasonable to reify a debt and thus unreasona-
ble to use a non-personal service statute like § 1655; and what light does
the structure and history of federal interpleader law throw upon this
problem?
In 1917, soon after the Dunlevy decision, Congress passed the Fed-
eral Insurance Interpleader Act 9 7 granting the United States District
Courts jurisdiction over bills of interpleader if the adverse claimants
94. Swan, 441 F.2d at 1085; Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 519 F. Supp. at 687;
Pan American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Revere, 188 F. Supp. 474, 480 (E.D. La. 1960).
95. See Chafee, Interstate Intepleader, supra note 2, at 687.
96. See Bache Halsev Stuart Shields, Inc., 519 F. Supp. at 687; Chafee, .1lodenizing
hitepleader, supra note 2, at 818 (quoting Vice Chancellor Wigram in Crawford v.
Fisher (1842, Ch.) I. Hary 436, 441).
97. Act of Feb. 22, 1917, ch. 113, 39 Stat. 929 (repealed 1926).
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were citizens of different states.9 8 Since 1917, several interpleader stat-
utes have been enacted, the modem versions being codified at 28 U.S.C
§§ 1335, 1397, and 2361 ("statutory interpleader"). 99 Additionally, in
1938, a liberalized version of the equitable interpleader went into effect
through Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("rule inter-
pleader").' 0 0 Thus, modern interpleader law consists of two types of
interpleader actions: statutory interpleader' 0 t and rule interpleader. t0 2
These two forms of interpleader differ in three principal ways:
98. Chafee, Interstate Interpleader, supra note 2, at 722-23. "Insurance companies
were singled out as the stakeholders who most solely needed interstate inter-
pleader." Id.
99. See infra notes 101, 123, and 132 for text of §§ 1335, 1387, and 2361, which
are the Interpleader, Venue and Process statutes controlling statutory interpleader.
The Act ofJan. 20, 1936, ch. 13, 49 Stat. 1096, expanded the class of parties able to
bring interpleader actions to "any person, firm, corporation or society." See 7
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 5, § 1701.
100. Chafee, Federal Interpleader Since the Act of 1936, supra note 2, at 379.
101. 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1982) provides:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action of
interpleader or in the nature of interpleader filed by any person, firm, or
corporation, association, or society having in his or its custody or possession
money or property of the value of $500 or more, or having issued a note,
bond, certificate, policy of insurance, or other instrument of value or amount
of $500 or more, or providing for the delivery or payment or the loan of
money or property of such amount or value, or being under any obligation
written or unwritten to the amount of $500 or more, if
(1) Two or more adverse claimants, of diverse citizenship as defined in sec-
tion 1332 of this title, are claiming or may claim to be entitled to such money
or property, or to any one or more of the benefits arising by virtue of any
note, bond, certificate, policy or other instrument, or arising by virtue of such
obligation; and if (2) the plaintiff has deposited such money or property or
has paid the amount of or the loan or other value of such instrument or the
amount due under such obligation into the registry of the court, there to
abide the judgment of the court, or has given bond payable to the clerk of the
court in such amount and with such surety as the court or judge may deem
proper, conditioned upon the compliance by the plaintiff with the future
order or judgment of the court with respect to the subject matter of the
controversy.
(b) Such an action may be entertained although the titles or claims of the
conflicting claimants do not have a common origin, or are not identical, but
are adverse to and independent of one another.
102. FFD. R. Civ. P. 22 provides:
(1) Persons having claims against the plaintiff may bejoined as defendants
and required to interplead when their claims are such that the plaintiff is or
may be exposed to double or multiple liability. It is not grounds for objec-
tion to the joinder that the claims of the several claimants or the titles on
which their claims depend do not have a common origin or are not identical
but are adverse to and independent of one another, or that the plaintiff avers
that he is not liable in whole or in part to any or all of the claimants. A
defendant exposed to similar liability may obtain such interpleader by way of
cross-claim or counterclaim. The provisions of this rule supplement and do
not in any way limit the joinder of parties permitted in Rule 20.
(2) The remedy herein provided is in addition to and in no way supersedes
or limits the remedy provided by Title 28, U.S.C. §§ 1335, 1397, and 2361.
Actions under those provisions shall be conducted in accordance with these
rules.
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(1) requirements for subject matter jurisdiction; (2) requirements for
territorial jurisdiction and service; and (3) venue. The differences
between these two types of interpleader are central in determining
whether applying § 1655 to interpleader actions is consistent with the
structure and history of federal interpleader law.
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Requirements1
0 3
One difference between rule interpleader and statutory interpleader is
their separate and distinct requirements for subject matter jurisdiction.
Because Rule 22 has no specific provision governing subject matter
jurisdiction, either a federal question must be present, 10 4 or diversity of
citizenship must exist between the stakeholder and the claimants with an
amount in controversy in excess of $10,000.105 Under Strawbridge v. Cur-
tiss,10 6 § 1332 diversity for rule interpleader must be complete as
between claimants and the stakeholder,10 7 but diversity among the
claimants themselves is unnecessary.' 08 For example, the stakeholder
may be a citizen of state A and the claimants may be citizens of any state
other than A even if they are all citizens of the same state.
For statutory interpleader, however, Congress provided in § 1335 a
103. Subject matter jurisdiction is controlled by the § 1331 federal question
statute and the § 1332 diversity of citizenship statute.
104. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982) provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.
105. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982) provides, in pertinent part:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $ 10,000, exclu-
sive of interest and costs, and is between-
(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state;
(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign
state are additional parties; and
(4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603 (a) of this title, as plaintiff and
citizens of a State or of different States.
106. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). The Strawbridge Court stated:
The words of the act of congress are, "where an alien is a party; or the suit
is between a citizen of a state where the suit is brought, and a citizen of
another state."
The Court understands these expressions to mean that each distinct inter-
est should be represented by persons, all of whom are entitled to sue, or may
be sued in the federal courts. That is, that where the interest is joint, each of
the persons concerned in that interest must be competent to sue, or liable to
be sued, in those courts.
Id.
107. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. First Nat. Bank of Shreveport, 675 F.2d 633, 637, n.9
(5th Cir. 1982); Haynes v. Felder, 239 F.2d 868, 870-76 (5th Cir. 1957) (in statutory
interpleader action, sufficient diversity existed when the disinterested plaintiff stake-
holder was a citizen of Texas, and one claimant, a citizen of Texas, was opposed by
four joint claimants, of whom three were citizens of Texas and one was a citizen of
Tennessee); 14 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 5, § 3636, at 73; Annotation, Federal
Interpleader Proceeding as In Rem or In Personam in Context of Problem of Service of Process
Upon Particular Claimant, 17 A.L.R. FED. 447, 459 (1973).
108. 3A MOORE's FEDERAL PRAcTICE, supra note 32, 22.04 [2-1], at 22-17.
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specific clause to cover the question of subject matter jurisdiction.10 9
Accordingly, § 1335 overrides the §§ 1331 and 1332 provisions gov-
erning general federal question and diversity actions that are controlling
in rule interpleader. Section 1335 says that subject matter jurisdiction
exists if there are "[t]wo or more adverse claimants, of diverse citizen-
ship", the amount in controversy equals or exceeds $500, and the stake-
holder has deposited the stake with the court or provided the court with
a bond equal to the value of the stake. 110 The Supreme Court has
determined that statutory interpleader requires only minimal diversity
of citizenship between or among the claimants." ' I Therefore, only one
claimant must be a citizen of a different state; diversity among the other
claimants or between the claimants is unnecessary." 12
Because of the different diversity requirements, some cases will
meet the requirements of only one of the two interpleader actions. 1 1 3
For example, if the citizenship of the stakeholder is necessary to estab-
lish diversity because all the claimants are foreigners or citizens of the
same state, then only rule interpleader will apply.' '4 Determining which
interpleader action may be maintained begins, therefore, by examining
the citizenship of the parties involved.
B. Territorial Jurisdiction and Service
To maintain an interpleader action a court must have territorial jurisdic-
tion over the parties as well as subject matterjurisdiction. This require-
ment is another major area where the two types of interpleader actions
take different approaches.
In interpleader actions at equity (the forerunner of rule inter-
pleader) territorial jurisdiction existed only over claimants present or
domiciled within the forum state who could be served personally or who
consented to the court's jurisdiction. " 5 In modern rule interpleader,
109. 14 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 5, § 3636 at 71.
110. 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1982).
I 11. Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66, 71 (1939) (diversity met where
one group of claimants, all of whom were citizens of Washington State, opposed
another group of claimants, all of whom were citizens of Idaho, even though the
stakeholder was a citizen of Washington, because the Interpleader Act requires diver-
sity only as between the claimants); Haynes v. Felder, 239 F.2d at 870-76 (see com-
ment at note 100).
112. See State Farm & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967); Felder, 239
F.2d at 873 (complete diversity is inapplicable to statutory interpleader actions); 14
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 5, § 3636, at 77.
113. Rule interpleader requires complete diversity and looks only at the relation-
ship between the stakeholder and the claimants, while statutory interpleader requires
only minimal diversity among the claimants; see supra notes 107 and 112 and accom-
panying text.
114. Republic of China v. American Express Co., 195 F.2d 230 (2d. Cir. 1952) (all
claimants were foreigners); A/S Krediit Bank v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 155 F. Supp.
30 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (all claimants were foreigners); Consolidated Underwriters of
South Carolina Ins. Co. v. Bradshaw, 136 F. Supp 395 (W.D. Ark. 1955) (all claim-
ants were citizens of the same state).
115. 7 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 5, § 1711, at 556.
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Rule 4 (f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure controls service.1 16
Rule 4 (f), as originally enacted, continued the equity limitations by
restricting service to "anywhere within the territorial limits of the state
in which the district court is held .. 1.. ,117 In 1963, however, Congress
amended Rule 4 (e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to allow
district courts to order extraterritorial service "under the circumstances
and in the manner" provided by the statutes or rules of the forum
state." 18 This amendment expressly allows district courts to use a forum
state's long-arm statute to extend service to out-of-state claimants.19
This amendment, however, did not solve the Dunlevy problem for
rule interpleader because state long-arm statutes cannot provide for an
unreasonable reification of a debt. 120 In response to the problem of
stakeholders serving out-of-state claimants, Congress developed statu-
tory interpleader,t21 which provides for nationwide service 12 2 pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2361.123 This extension of territorial jurisdiction and
service under statutory interpleader did not reject the principle that
interpleader is a personal action, 124 but rather aimed at solving the Dun-
levy problem for interstate interpleading. However, statutory inter-
pleader service is only national, not international. 12 5 While statutory
interpleader solved the Dunlevy problem for cases involving claimants
domiciled or found in the United States, it did not solve this problem for
non-resident or unfound claimants. 1
26
116. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f); see 7 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 5, § 1711, at 557.
117. Id.
118. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e); 7 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 5, § 1711, at 558.
119. 7 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 5, § 1711, at 558.
120. Cordner v. Metro Life Ins. Co., 234 F. Supp. 765, 771-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); 7
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 5, § 1711, at 559, n.17.
121. Federal Insurance Interpleader Act, supra notes 97 and 99. See 7 WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 5, § 1701 at 486; Chafee, Interstate Interpleader, supra note 2, at 720-
22.
122. Georgia Say. Bank & Trust Co. v. Sims, 321 F. Supp. 307, 309 (N.D. Ga.
1971) (under the Interpleader Act, process may issue "throughout the United
States").
123. 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1982) provides:
In any civil action of interpleader or in the nature of interpleader under
section 1335 of this title, a district court may issue its process for all claimants
and enter its order restraining them from instituting or prosecuting any pro-
ceeding in any State or United States court affecting the property, instrument
or obligation involved in the interpleader action until further order of the
court. Such process and order shall be returnable at such time as the court or
judge thereof directs, and shall be addressed to and served by the United
States marshalls for the respective districts where the claimants reside or may
be found.
Such district court shall hear and determine the case, and may discharge
the plaintiff from further liability, make the injunction permanent, and make
all appropriate orders to enforce its judgment.
124. 7 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 5, § 1711, at 559.
125. Id. at 557.
126. Cordner v. Metro Life Ins. Co., 234 F. Supp. at 767, n.2; Kuerschner &
Rauchwarenfabrik, A.G. v. New York Trust Co., 126 F. Supp. 684, 689 (S.D.N.Y.
1954); 7 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 5, § 1711, at 557.
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This interpleader jurisdicitonal grant is provided only to federal
courts; it does not apply to state courts. The United States Constitution
allows Congress to extend federal courts' territorial jurisdiction to the
borders of the United States for personal actions, limited only by the
due process clause of the fifth amendment. 12 7 State courts, however,
are limited by the fourteenth amendment's due process clause, and can-
not assume nationwide jurisdiction and service in personal actions.' 28
Hence, only by granting nationwide jurisdiction to federal courts could
Congress solve the interstate service problems that may occur in per-
sonal interpleader actions.
C, Venue
Venue is the final area where rule and statutory interpleader diverge.
Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure lacks a specific venue
provision; it is controlled by the general venue provision in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391.129 Therefore, a rule interpleader action based solely on diver-
sity may be brought where all plaintiffs reside, where all defendants
reside, or where the claim arose;' 3 0 a rule interpleader action resting on
federal question jurisdiction may be brought where all defendants reside
or where the claim arose.' 3 1
Venue for statutory interpleader is governed by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1397.132 A statutory interpleader action may be brought "in the judi-
cial district in which one or more of the claimants reside."' 133
V. Congressional Intent Behind Federal Interpleader Law
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the differences between rule
and statutory interpleader result in cases where only one type of action
is maintainable, cases where both types of actions are maintainable, and
cases where neither type of action is maintainable. No action is main-
tainable, for example, where a claimant cannot be found or is outside
127. 7 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 5, § 1711, at 560; Clermont, supra note 4, at
427.
128. Clermont, supra note 4, at 423-26; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 24, at 108 (1971).
129. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1982) provides, in pertinent part:
(a) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citi-
zenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in the
judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or in which the
claim arose.
(b) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of
citizenship may be brought only in the judicial district where all defendants
reside, or in which the claim arose, except as otherwise provided by law.
130. 7 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 5, § 1712, at 567-68.
131. Id. at 567.
132. 28 U.S.C. § 1397 provides:
Any civil action of interpleader or in the nature of interpleader under sec-
tion 1335 of this title may be brought in the judicial district in which one or
more of the claimants reside.
133. Id.
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the U.S., thus beyond statutory interpleader personal jurisdiction, and
the stake itself is inadequate to support reification thence justifying non-
personal service under § 1655. Courts sometimes use § 1655 to attempt
to reach this small number of cases. ' 3 4 This section argues that the con-
gressional intent behind interpleader law makes such judicial attempts
improper.
In developing and revising the Federal Interpleader Act, Congress
resolved the jurisdictional questions, associated with interstate inter-
pleading, raised by Dunlevy. Statutory interpleader provides for nation-
wide service and covers claims against virtually any form of property or
debt. Only two interpleader situations remain in which claimants cannot
resort to statutory interpleader even though subject matter jurisdiction
exists: (1) where one or more of the claimants who reside in the United
States cannot be served within the United States because they have
changed their domicile without reporting it and they do not have an
agent who the court may serve; and (2) where one or more of the claim-
ants reside outside of the United States and refuse to enter and to be
served. 135 Congress's decision not to extend interpleader dictates
against the courts using § 1655 to cover the two situations mentioned
above unless the stake can reasonably support non-personal
jurisdiction.
13 6
The underlying structure of the first interpleader statute assumed
that the insurance actions it was meant to cover were personal actions,
and therefore a non-personal service statute such as § 1655 would not
apply. In explaining the purpose of this first interpleader statute, the
SenateJudiciary Committee stated that the forerunner of § 1655 did not
apply to the interpleader situations at which that first interpleader stat-
ute was aimed.'
3 7
The provisions of section 57, in which it is provided that "actions to
enforce legal or equitable liens, or to remove any incumbrance, lien, or
cloud upon title to real or personal property within the district where the
suit is brought, service may be had on nonresident defendants by publica-
tion," would be an ample remedy and cure the evil complained of if a
policy of life insurance or the proceeds thereof, when contested by rival
claimants, were property within the district. The Federal courts in many
decisions have determined that neither a policy of insurance nor the pro-
ceeds thereof, when contested for by rival claimants was property within
the district. Stockbridge v. Insurance Co. (193 Fed., 558); Evans v.
Scribners Sons (58 Fed., 303).138
134. The Garmaise court is one example.
135. Id. at 557.
136. See S. REP. No. 660, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1915-16).
137. Id. The original interpleader statute was limited to insurance companies and
fraternal beneficiary societies. It was codified as Judicial Code 911, § 57. As dis-
cussed previously, the jurisdictional inquiries for whether the stake can support non-
personal jurisdiction is whether there is reasonable reification and a reasonable
forum.
138. TheJudiciary Committee also cited the district and appellate court opinions
in Dunlevy as examples of a situation where double recovery against the insurance
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The Senate report indicates that Congress realized that a non-per-
sonal service statute such as § 1655 cannot be applied to interpleader
actions where it is unreasonable to reify a debt and therefore unreasona-
ble to apply non-personal jurisdiction. Congress limited service for stat-
utory interpleader to personal service by United States marshals in the
district where a claimant resides or may be found. 13 9 Congress did not
provide for service by publication or for the interpleader action to pro-
ceed if the United States marshal could not personally serve the claimant
in a United States district. Congress did not provide for service of
claimants who could not be served personally within a district of the
United States, thus excluding foreign claimants residing outside the
United States.
Yet another clue to Congress's understanding of the Dunlevy situa-
tion can be seen in its 1936 enactment of the Federal Interpleader Act,
removing the limitations on the type of companies which could file bills
of interpleader. 140 The Senate report explained that this extension of
interpleader was meant to provide relief for businesses such as "rail-
roads, warehouses, banks (especially savings banks), and oil companies
operating under licenses when ownership of the royalties is disputed or
uncertain." 4 1 This extension suggests that Congress agreed with Pro-
fessor Chafee's argument that, in terms of whether they can be reified,
insurance debts are not fundamentally different from other debts. If
Congress believed that only insurance companies faced the Dunlevy
problem of having a stake incapable of reification, it seems unlikely it
would have extended federal interpleader's generous service provisions
to cover these new businesses.
The Senate Judiciary Committee based its report on the research
and writing of Professor Chafee, who, according to the committee "pre-
pared a monograph on the bill for the section of insurance law of the
American Bar Association."'
14 2
Professor Chafee also drafted the bill which served as the basis of
the Federal Interpleader Bill.1 43 Thus, Chafee's theories are important
not only in and of themselves, but also to help ascertain congressional
intent. As discussed above, Chafee believed that a non-personal service
statute could be applied only in certain interpleader situations. 14 4 To
use a non-personal service statute, Chafee believed that courts must jus-
tify how interpleader of a debt could be non-personal, or rather how the
situation facing them is different from that in Dunlevy. Essentially, his
theory asserts that the reification process must be reasonable and that
company could result from one obligation. Id. The Supreme Court had not ren-
dered its decision in Dunlevy when the Senate released its report.
139. Act of Feb. 22, 1917, 39 Stat. 113.
140. Chafee, The Federal Inteipleader Act 0f1936: I, supra note 2, at 966.
141. S. REP. No. 1417, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
142. Id.
143. H.R. No. 1437, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
144. See supra notes 40-52 and accompanying text.
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the exercise of non-personal jurisdiction in a given forum must be
reasonable.
Legislative history indicates that the federal interpleader law was to
provide interstate service for situations where a debt's reification was
unreasonable and to allow businesses to use the efficient statutory inter-
pleader even where a debt's reification would be reasonable. 14 5 How-
ever, Congress limited service and territorial jurisdiction to situations
meeting the requirements for in personam actions. This action suggests
that Congress was concerned more with reaching situations where a
debt could not be reasonably reified than with providing a more conve-
nient method of interpleader for businesses which could already protect
themselves from multiple vexation on a single obligation. By thus limit-
ing service, Congress again indicated a belief that many non-insurance
debts are, like insurance debts, incapable of reification, and thus inade-
quate to support non-personal service under § 1655.
VI. Suggestions for Change
Courts have distinguished Dunlevy as a case limited to its specific facts
and applied § 1655 to interpleader actions without inquiring into the
reasonableness of reifying a particular debt. This approach is unsatis-
factory. A proper solution requires action on two fronts: (1) courts
should apply a reasonableness standard to the reification process; and
(2) the Federal Interpleader Act needs minor reform.
To reform the Federal Interpleader Act, Congress should amend
§ 2361, which now provides for nationwide service, by adding "or
served pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4", after the word
"found" at the end of the first paragraph. This change would allow fed-
eral courts to apply state long-arm statutes and, thus, reach foreigners
who fall within those statutes. It would also specifically allow courts to
apply § 1655 when the stake can reasonably support non-personal
jurisdiction.
VII. Conclusion
Under modern jurisdictional principles, New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dun-
levy 146 is still good law. Courts may apply non-personal jurisdiction to
interpleader proceedings only when the chosen forum is reasonable,
and when the stake is a tangible object or can reasonably be reified.
Reasonableness depends upon whether the intangible thing is embodied
in a document or is represented by specific discrete assets. Whether the
exercise of non-personal jurisdiction in a chosen forum is reasonable
depends upon the degree of prejudice a claimant would face by having
his claims adjudicated in the selected forum, the state's interest in pro-
viding a forum for a single and final resolution of the claims to the stake,
145. See supra notes 136-43 and accompanying text.
146. 241 U.S. 518 (1916).
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the connection between the forum and the stake, the stakeholder's inter-
ests in having the claims adjudicated in the selected forum, and the
American and international legal systems' interests in furthering the
substantive social policies promoted by interpleader law.
Rather than bypassing the Dunlevy problem-cases where the stake
cannot be reified and the court cannot obtain personal service upon for-
eign claimants-courts should inquire into the reasonableness of
reifying a particular debt. Furthermore, Congress should amend the
Federal Interpleader Act to provide for service of process to foreign
claimants under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4. This change would
ensure that, even where the Dunlevy problem exists, foreign claimants
who could be served under state long-arm statutes, would be under the
jurisdiction of federal courts in statutory interpleader actions. These
changes would further interpleader's central purpose, namely, insuring
that stakeholders have a forum where all parties can be brought together
for a single and final resolution of their claims to the stake.
Thomas C. Morrill
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